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Werner Marx, Schelling: Geschichte, System, Freiheit (Alber-Broschur, 
Freiburg-MUnchen, 1977) 156pp. 
 
The tendency in recent Schelling studies has been toward 
massive, all-encompassing interpretations, e.g. Harold Holz' 
Spekulation und Faktizität, J.-P. Marquet's Liberté et existence, and M. 
Veto's Le Fondement selon Schelling. Werner Marx, in the three essays 
collected here, chooses to focus on two important turning points in 
Schelling's speculative career — the System of Transcendental 
Idealism of 1800 and the 1809 Essay on Human Freedom. The narrow 
focus is motivated not by historical interest alone, but by Marx's 
assessment of the situation of philosophy today. Says Marx, 
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It would in fact be false to deny that the traditional foundation 
upon which Schelling's project rests can no longer basically 
correspond to our contemporary historical consciousness and to 
the altered vision of man and the world brought about by the 
domination of technology. But what foundation, then, is 
authoritative for our present-day thought, both for philosophy 
and science and for our everyday actions? Is such a foundation 
yet conceived? It is, I contend, the particular fate of our 
generation to live between the tradition and the beginning of a 
new foundation, to live in a time in which the old categories of 
knowledge and the old standards of ethical action weaken and 
disappear, in an age in which as yet no new foundation has 
appeared (pp. 13-14). 
 
Marx looks back to Schelling as a philosopher who thinks from, and 
consequently stands as a representative of, the tradition. These 
studies embody a nostalgia for the tradition, for Marx thinks that — 
whether our task be theory of history or practical philosophy or the 
attempt to provide any speculative or scientific account with 
systematic foundation — we necessarily lack the certainty Schelling's 
thought possessed, i.e. we lack the secure foundation of an Absolute 
and find the theological presuppositions that helped us make sense of 
history and human action and provided the closure and finality of 
systematic knowledge all discredited. 
 
The first essay, "Grundbegriffe der Geschichtesauffassung bei 
Schelling und Habermas," contrasts the explicit teleological, indeed 
theological, foundations of the theory of history found in Schelling's 
1800 System with the problematic, and apparently unfounded, 
teleology of Habermas' vision of history in Erkenntnis und Interesse. 
 
Schelling sees history as an objectification of the will, indeed its 
highest grade of objectification, where its rationality is no longer 
obscured by the arbitrary nature of individuals' acts. "History," he 
says, "is there only where one ideal is realized through infinitely many 
variations, and realized so that not only the particular but indeed the 
totality come into congruence with it (3:588)." This one ideal is the 
concept of a world-order wherein freedom, the essence of self-
consciousness, would be realized in a thoroughly law-like manner. 
Schelling calls this world-state a "second and higher nature," meaning 
by 'nature' something like a mechanica order, wherein things are 
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governed by necessity and not by caprice. Since Schelling contends 
that freedom can be maintained and enhanced only when supported 
by such an order of necessity, we can see that his notion of history as 
a tendency moving to bring human events into a universal world-order 
brings the concepts of freedom and necessity into an absolute 
contradiction. And yet there is the demand that these be made one 
and harmonized. 
 
Marx observes that the task of solving the contradiction 
between human freedom and natural necessity pervades Schelling's 
thought in all stages and is its great systematic theme. In 1800 he 
solves the freedom-necessity problem in the following way: Since the 
whole of the (philosophically reconstructed) world of the Self stems 
from a dialectical interplay of unconscious productivity and conscious 
or reflective appropriation thereof, the togetherness of unconscious act 
and conscious recognition must be established definitively in a 'highest 
synthesis,' which of course overreaches ordinary consciousness. This 
synthesis binds together freedom and necessity and integrates the will 
of individual agents into the world-historical teleological process. The 
1800 System, setting out to think the ground of the law-like character 
of freedom and the freedom or spontaneity of the lawfulness of nature 
from both sides, thus arrives at their necessary identity, and with the 
postulation of this identity takes on a metaphysical or indeed 
theological character. Marx notes that for religion such a complete 
synthesis is nothing other than God and that, therefore, Schelling's 
theory of history has explicitly theological presuppositions, whether or 
not Schelling in 1800 would state them in the language religion 
traditionally uses. 
 
Marx is hardly critical of this teleological and theological 
foundation for the System, but he is critical of the work's failure to 
harmonize the postulated absolute synthesis of freedom and necessity 
with any meaningful sense of human freedom. As Marx rightly sees, 
Schelling's system is vitiated by an irreconcilable contradiction. The 
system is supposed to be founded on freedom and as a whole to be 
nothing other than the outworking of freedom as productivity and as 
coming-to-consciousness, yet it ends up a system of blind necessity, 
wherein the rationality of human agency is in fact denied. It is not until 
the 1809 freedom essay that Schelling attempts to think through in a 
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more profound and reflective way a possible harmonization of human 
freedom and rationality with the freedom/necessity of the Absolute. 
 
Marx then turns his attention to Jürgen Habermas' view of 
history. Habermas' theory is expounded from a Marxian basis, where 
in history is seen as the process of human self-production.  Self-
production,' however, is given a radically non-Marxian interpretation, 
i.e. an epistemological and transcendental one, in that Habermas 
contends that work indeed transforms nature for human use, but that 
the crucial element in such transformation is reflection or the power of 
reason. Man not only makes himself through praxis, but through 
rational praxis. Marx comments that with this granting of an 
independent status to reflection as the motor of history's evolution 
toward the 'emancipated society,' Habermas' theory becomes explicitly 
teleological. The problem, though, is to ground or in some sense 
explain this teleological orientation of reflection toward human 
emancipation, fir the theological presuppositions that undergird a 
theory of history such as Schelling's have been totally discredited. 
 
Marx observes that Habermas' notion of reflection is deeply 
confused. (1) The concept of reflection does not sort well with the 
basic Marxian view of history Habermas espouses. Reflection is 
plausibly located within class-consciousness, but Habermas neglects to 
explain the possible transition between work on the material basis to 
the emergence of reflective consciousness. (2) Habermas borrows his 
concept of reflection from Hegel, but the kind of reflection he has in 
mind lacks the sceptical or negatively self-related character of 
Hegelian consciousness. (3) What dimension of human spirituality or 
transcendence that Habermas introduces into his theory by turning to 
Hegel for the concept of reflection if vitiated by his turning to Freudian 
psychotherapy for a working-model of reflection. Taking 
psychotherapy as the model of the rational dialogue that can go on 
within a society, Habermas actually limits the role of human reflection, 
and certainly of human freedom. Marx argues that there is something 
deeply contradictory in Habermas' adoption of reflection as the motor 
of historical development, something deeply ungrounded in a 
teleological view of history that has cut itself off from theological 
presuppositions. Marx finds in Habermas, "the dilemma of a theory of 
history that indeed implicitly pursues its pattern in a teleological 
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manner while wishing to overcome teleology, yet being unable to set it 
aside" (p.62). 
 
In his second essay, "Aufgabe und Methode der Philosophie in 
Schelling‘s System des transzendentale Idealismus und in Hegel‘s 
Phänomenologie des Geistes," Marx compares the systematic 
standpoints of Schelling in 1800 and of Hegel in 1807. His supposition 
is that the two works are parallel and differ only in the way they seek 
to solve a commonly held vision of the task of philosophy, enunciated 
by Hegel in the Differzschrift as "die Aufhebung der Entzweiung" — the 
resolution of dichotomies common to ordinary consciousness and 
traditional philosophy alike, oppositions between subjectivity and 
objectivity, between reason and ethical activity, between intelligence 
and nature. Marx seeks to vindicate Schelling's central system-
concept, intellectual intuition, and to show that, despite the polemics 
Hegel introduced into the Phenomenology's 'Preface,' it is as adequate 
a system-principle as Hegel's own reflection. 
 
Marx begins by noting that despite differences in detail and 
vigorous polemical discussions, Fichte, the young Schelling and Hegel 
are in agreement: Philosophy as Wissenschaft is made possible by, 
and founded upon, that dimension of freedom found in finite self-
consciousness. That freedom is represented in the System precisely by 
the notion of intellectual intuition, for therein Schelling claimed, "the 
beginning and end of this philosophy is freedom, the absolute 
indemonstrable, that which can be proven only through itself" (3:376). 
Packed into the concept of intellectual intuition, claims Marx, are the 
notions of freedom, productivity, spontaneity, and self certification. 
 
Marx acutely observes that behind the concept of intellectual 
intuition in the 1800 System is Schelling's conviction that there is a 
pre-reflexive, spontaneous and productive side of reason — in other 
words, reason is operative in, and constitutive of, the world at a level 
that is beyond the comprehension of ordinary consciousness. 
Accordingly the System calls all pre-conscious and constitutive acts 
'acts of intuition' and organizes its systematization of human 
knowledge as a progressive coming-to-consciousness of these 
preconscious productive acts. Schelling conceives intellectual intuition 
as simultaneously the power to posit itself and the power to limit itself. 
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It is an identity of opposites, but always a synthetic identity; within 
self-intuition (and self constitution) there is always a duplicity, always 
a uniting of opposites in the unity of intuition. 
 
Marx then asks whether intellectual intuition can provide the 
necessity requisite for system, whether there is a logical impossibility 
of moving from the Absolute to the finite. He denies these contentions, 
for at the heart of the concept of intellectual intuition is the idea of a 
spontaneous productivity, one which, though its workings be pre-
conscious, heads teleologically toward a fully conscious self-
recognition. The System portrays the hierarchy of the acts constitutive 
of reason as a history of self-consciousness and brilliantly solves the 
problem of the basic duplicity of the Self in making the final stage 
aesthetic intuition, the perfect union of unconscious activity and 
conscious recognition. 
 
It is Marx's defense of the importance of aesthetic intuition as 
the final and definitive form of intellectual intuition that distinguishes 
his interpretation of the System and allows him to oppose it to an 
Hegelian position. To maintain this interpretation, Marx must dismiss 
certain quasi-Hegelian misunderstandings of the System, some of 
which Schelling himself authored in his 1827 Lectures on the History of 
Modern Philosophy. He argues (1) that though Schelling distinguishes 
the philosophizing "we" from the self "for-itself," the distinction is not 
the motor of the system's development, but merely a rhetorical 
device. (2) Unlike the Phenomenology, the System is neither a 
Biidungsgeschichte nor a recollection of itself on the part of self-
consciousness nor is it (as Schelling himself claimed in 1827) the work 
of consciousness coming to itself. (3) It is unnecessary that there be a 
structure of negative self-relation inside consciousness in order to 
provide a system principle. For inbuilt into the concept of intellectual 
intuition is the idea of third power or activity which mediates between 
the opposed activities constitutive of consciousness, that now switches 
from one pole to the other but remains essentially free between them, 
viz. imagination. If indeed Einbildungskraft lies at the heart of 
Schelling's notion of the productivity of reason, then the system is 
adequately founded on self-intuition. The 1800 System, claims Marx, is 
adequate precisely as an aesthetic reconstruction of the acts 
constitutive of consciousness. 
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Marx then discusses the basic differences between Hegel's 
Phenomenology and the 1800 System. (1) Hegel maintains that 
'reflection,' reason's negative self-relation, is the natural form of 
consciousness, while Schelling had maintained that intellectual 
intuition was pre-reflexive and hidden from the workings of ordinary 
consciousness — a profound difference and one that definitively marks 
the two works off from one another. (2) The Phenomenology is truly a 
history of consciousness, while the System is but an apparent history, 
a presentation of the one synthesis constitutive of the finite rational 
self as a succession of discrete acts. (3) Hegel's work is genuinely 
phenomenological; it pivots around the concept of experience and the 
process consciousness undergoes in coming to itself. Schelling's 
sytem, by contrast, not only culminates in aesthetic intuition, but as a 
whole is an aesthetic construction — a freely undertaken 
reconstruction of the Self's original work of freedom. (4) For Hegel the 
law of progress for the system is experience or the appearance of 
knowledge coming to itself, while for Schelling the system's unfolding 
is determined by the Absolutes self-objectification in determined 
stages or "potencies." 
 
Marx concludes this essay with a discussion of criticisms brought 
against the adequacy of intellectual intuition by partisans of Schelling 
and Hegel alike. Indeed, in attempting to defend the cogency of 
intellectual intuition and in refusing to cede the place of honor to 
Hegelian reflection, Marx shows much sympathy for the metaphysical' 
element in the young Schelling's thought and the theological-
metaphysical tradition from which it stems. 
 
In his third essay, "Die Aufgabe der Freiheitsschrift Schellings," 
Marx focuses upon the major category-revision Schelling's thought 
underwent when, under the influence both of theosophical writers and 
of the Neoplatonic tradition, he returned to his central theme, human 
freedom. 
 
Marx notes that from Parmenides onward, the history of 
metaphysics has centered around the identity of thought and being. 
The 1800 System stands inside this tradition, for it must ultimately 
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posit a coincidence of freedom and necessity, or their metaphysical 
identity, beyond the boundaries of our experience. In Marx's eyes, it is 
the achievement of Schelling's identity-philosophy (1801-1806) to 
come to recognize the incongruence of that identity with human 
freedom. The identity-philosophy generally conceives human freedom 
as connected to and absorbed into the freedom of the Absolute , i.e. 
into its all-encompassing productivity. But as early as 1802, Schelling 
begins to break away from the Spinozistic engulfment of the particular 
by the Absolute and to edge toward a more vivid sense of human 
freedom. The problem of the particularity of the existent individual, its 
division from the Absolute, the factical character of finite existence — 
all of these build tensions within the identity-philosophy and finally 
motivate its abandonment. In the 1809 freedom-essay Schelling 
comes to the significant realization that if human freedom is to have a 
real and not merely a formal sense, it must be given an ethical and an 
ethical-political interpretation. Freedom is now seen concretely to be 
the possibility of good and evil. The tensions which had earlier rent the 
identity-philosophy, combined with the problem of evil, move Schelling 
to undertake a total reinterpretation of the concept of freedom. 
 
Marx correctly acknowledges that the center of the 1809 Essay 
is not the notion of human freedom, but that of the Absolute. Schelling 
in no way abandoned his goal of systematic philosophy in the years 
1809-1815, but the Absolute or system-principle is now grasped in 
such a way that it becomes the ground of explanation for human 
freedom and ethical activity. Thus Schelling comes to reinterpret the 
static logical-metaphysical identity of his earlier thought in moral 
terms. The Absolute is primarily conceived in terms of 'life' — as a 
process of development through conflict, as an organic process that 
results in personality, freedom and ethical actuality. 
 
The 1809 Essay explains the evolution, or better, the 
personalization of God as a process which moves between two poles. 
At one end — and Marx insists this is just a limiting concept — there is 
a static primal unity, the 'Unground.' At the other end is the 
achievement of personality, the full realization of will. It is God's 
essence to go out of primal, self-contained unity, thus to differentiate 
himself from his origin and to move toward the fully articulated and 
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harmonized unity of conflicting principles which Schelling calls 
'personality.' 
 
The Unground, or 'God' as pure unity, pure being is but a 
limiting concept; the real Absolute is properly conceived as will. As will 
or self-affirming being, God is seen to contain two conflicting 
principles, called 'ground' and 'existence.' Each of these principles is 
voluntary; the life of the former is conceived as desire and (its moral 
counterpart) self-will, while the life of the latter is conceived as 
representation and (its moral counterpart) the will to self-revelation or 
communication. Each of these principles has an independent life; the 
properly personal God emerges from their conflict and interplay, i.e. 
he becomes their identity. This process of achieving full personality 
necessitates the creation of the finite realms of nature and of spirit, for 
only by letting the Ground go free and attain real independence can its 
longing for selfhood be satisfied and only by revealing himself to 
independent moral beings or persons can Existence's will-to-love be 
satisfied. 
 
Thus Schelling pictures the developed Godhead as a personal 
God standing over against an independent world, a world which is the 
work of his freedom, his self-development. Marx observes that in 1809 
Schelling attributes to the Absolute the kind of freedom that fits with a 
conscious and moral being. In this new kind of freedom, Marx 
distinguishes three separate moments: (1) freedom as ability to begin, 
as spontaneity or productivity (as in the 1800 System); (2) freedom as 
a voluntary binding of oneself to a necessity, self-determination or 
Spinozistic freedom; and (3) the freedom Kant had ascribed to the 
pure will, viz. autonomy or 'personality.' 
 
Schelling derives his account of human freedom from the 
structure pf the Absolute's. God's freedom, at its fullest, consists in a 
perfect, indissoluble union of the contradictory principles or 'wills.,' In 
human freedom or personality, these same principles are bound 
together in a finite and dissoluble way, so that human freedom is 
properly characterized as the power to decide for good and evil. Since 
in man the natural or self-enclosing principle may or may not be 
subordinated to the spiritual or other-affirming principle, moral 
goodness is seen to mean the affirmation and endorsement of the 
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proper order of being, while moral evil overturns that order in allowing 
the natural principle to attain to independence. 
 
When Schelling contends that human freedom is the power to 
decide for good and for evil, he returns to his theme of the 
intertwining of necessity and freedom. Freedom never means arbitrary 
choice or caprice for him. He will claim, indeed, that "man is his own 
deed," but only in the sense that the one and definitive exercise of his 
freedom lies outside of time and consists in a 'choice of character.' The 
apparent freedom of an individual act is determined by the necessity 
of character, but this character is itself determined by a transcendental 
act of choice, a decision — much like Sartre's 'project' of Er's vision of 
the soul's choice of its fate. 
 
Marx concludes this essay by emphasizing the central role of the 
concept of life in the Freiheitsschrift. It provides the same motor for 
Schelling's 'system of freedom' as negativity provides for Hegel's 
system, that is, it constitutes the inner self-movement which posits 
itself in difference and contradiction in order to recover itself as fully 
articulated identity. It is the achievement of the freedom-essay, claims 
Marx, that Schelling conceptualizes the mutual limitation of human and 
divine freedom as well as their integration. As such, the work attempts 
to philosophically actualize the ethical, i.e. to make the ethical the 
foundation for the whole system of philosophy. 
 
Marx' essays are well-written and readily intelligible, and they 
frequently furnish valuable interpretive insights on Schelling's thought. 
This reviewer finds particularly informative the comparisons between 
Schelling's and Hegel's concepts and methods. Marx seems willing to 
criticize the teleological prejudice to which historians of philosophy 
have often fallen prey and to view Hegel and Schelling as co-workers 
striving to fulfill the cultural and spiritual calling of philosophy in their 
age, "die Aufhebung der Entzweiung." 
 
 
